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Abstract
Contrary to most countries practicing affirmative action, Malaysia and South Africa established
policies whose beneficiaries make up their demographic majority. Despite their socio-historical
similarities, their respective justifications for these policies were extremely different: Malaysia's
rationale was “retributive” in nature, whereas South Africa's was “restitutive.” This comparativeand-historical paper seeks not only to determine the factors that caused these different outcomes,
but also to provide an alternate perspective to existing scholarship on affirmative action policies,
most of which focus on minority-beneficiary nations. I argue that the differing outcomes can be
traced to their history of colonial rule, which influenced processes such as state formation and
policy and resulted in two societies that differed in how political and economic power were
initially distributed and how it transformed to their present-day outcomes.
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Malaysia and South Africa are both former colonies of the United Kingdom that have
been organized along racial and ethnic lines, which persist to this day. In the same vein, both
countries are also similar in that political and economic power has not been concentrated among
a single dominant ethnic group. Rather, the largest ethnic group of both nations’ populations
(those considered ‘natives’ at the time of colonization) wields political power, while economic
power is concentrated among members of an ethnic – and immigrant – minority. Most
importantly from a public policy standpoint and the focus of this paper, both nations have
established affirmative action policies whose intended beneficiaries make up the majority of their
respective populations. Both nations’ affirmative action policies seek to address the same
problem: to redistribute wealth from their respective minority economic elites to members of the
less prosperous majority ethnic group.
Generally speaking, affirmative action policies in majority-beneficiary democratic
nations (e.g. Malaysia, South Africa) strongly suggest some degree of political pressure from the
electorate. In contrast, the same case cannot be made for minority-beneficiary nations (e.g. the
United States, Australia), as segments of the political electorate majority would be opposed to
giving up any advantages, perceived or not, they have gained from historical inequalities. This
strongly suggests that minority-beneficiary affirmative action policies stem from other pressures,
such as international pressure and human rights discourse.
Despite these striking similarities, there is one glaring difference. Malaysia’s ethnic
groups coexisted relatively peacefully prior to independence, whereas South Africa had a very
well-known history of institutionalized racial discrimination under apartheid. Specifically
because the oppressed majority groups in both democratic countries make up the beneficiaries of
these affirmative action policies, conventional wisdom suggests that the country with peaceful
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race relations (Malaysia) would be more likely to adopt “restitutive” policies; whereas the
country with turbulent race relations (South Africa) would more likely have harsher,
“retributive” policies. Retributive affirmative action policies are policies which incorporate
measures which assign blame to and therefore actively place restrictions on members of a
specific group or groups. In contrast, restitutive rationales seek consensus and therefore do not
seek to assign blame nor bestow benefits on members of any specific group. Rather, restitutive
rationales acknowledge the broad inequalities which exist within a society and propose measures
framed in the language of inclusiveness. Theoretically, the benefits of restitutive policies could
be enjoyed by all members of society, rather than just the members of a particular group.
While policymakers in both countries advanced very distinct rationales to justify the
implementation of affirmative action policies in the two countries, these rationales did not
correspond to the characterization above: South Africa’s policies were based on a restitutive
rationale; Malaysia’s policies were advanced for retributive reasons. These differences in
rationales inform and explain the specific measures that are incorporated into the policies. What
accounts for the disjuncture between the history of inter-group relations and the nature and
rationale of policies to redress inequalities? I will broadly address this in the theoretical overview,
focusing specifically on debates surrounding racial/ethnic group formation and identity.
More specifically, in order to understand why these affirmative action policies came to be
the way they are, one has to first understand the origins of their underlying causes. This leads to
the research question that informs the core of this paper: what was responsible for Malaysia’s
peaceful racial coexistence and South Africa’s violent repression of their various ethnic groups,
and how did this affect the affirmative action policies that both countries eventually adopted? I
find that despite their many similarities, Malaysia’s and South Africa’s differences in affirmative
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action policies can be traced back to the circumstances surrounding each country’s respective
transition to independence, as this transition to independence essentially set in motion the
historical processes responsible for the two nations’ different policies. Central to this claim is the
causal logic that a country’s colonial history influences the type of state that forms upon
independence, and that state policies are an integral component of state formation. I will
elaborate in greater detail about this causal logic in the theoretical overview.

Case Selection
What was responsible for Malaysia’s peaceful racial coexistence and South Africa’s
violent repression of their various ethnic groups, and how did this affect the affirmative action
policies that both countries eventually adopted? The research question can be focused further:
how do we understand the different rationales for affirmative action policies given the two cases’
different transitions to independence? As I will elaborate upon in the theoretical overview, I am
essentially assuming that different rationales for affirmative action emerged from two unique
societies (and their respective societal divides), which owed their existence to the different
strategies which were imposed upon them during colonial rule. Both Malaysia and South Africa
are ideal cases for this comparison for many reasons. Despite their different transitions to
independence and the nature of their resulting affirmative action policies, both countries were
colonies of Great Britain and had multiple ethnic groups where the majority group did not hold
economic power.
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two possible outcomes to consider:
affirmative action policies with retributive rationales, as was observed in Malaysia; and
affirmative action policies with restitutive rationales, as was the case in South Africa. I have
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chosen to examine both countries’ history of colonial rule; and more specifically, their respective
transitions to independence, since independence represents the convergence of strategies
symbolizing the ideas and policies of the colonial era and the ideas and policies of the postcolonial state.
The connection between colonial strategies and policies enacted in the resulting
independent state reflects Wimmer and Min’s (2006: 869) finding that “[the] logic of nationalist
politics … may drive civil wars [and other forms of conflict], as majorities and ethnic minorities
compete for control of the state.” Nationalist politics are likely in the post-colonial era because
although nationalism provides unifying and empowering rationales and symbols for the newlyliberated as they seek to build their new state, different groups – who have been treated
differently under colonial rule – are likely to have different visions of what the state should be.
Advantaged groups would seek to use the state to preserve their advantaged status, while
marginalized groups would strive for equality and/or retribution.
This comparative and historical analysis will be organized in three sections based on the
causal mechanisms I develop in the following theoretical overview. The first section of my
analysis – history of colonial rule – seeks to define and contextualize the reasons behind
Malaysia’s relatively peaceful transition to independence, in contrast to South Africa’s violent
struggle for independence. The second section – ethnic relations in the post-colonial state – seeks
to examine some of the key historical processes which I have deemed to have had the most
influence on the two observed outcomes. These processes include: the basis of franchise, the
distribution of economic opportunities, and the role of international pressure. I will then briefly
discuss the two policy outcomes before concluding this paper.
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Theoretical Overview
Racial/ethnic group formation is a core concept in political sociology. After all, there
have historically been few ethnically-homogenous nations, and even then it was impossible for
them to avoid coming into contact with outsiders who spoke different languages, adhered to
different religions, and followed different cultures. Hence, the division of societies among ethnic
lines is a very commonly-observed phenomenon, as the following theoretical overview will
illustrate. Since both Malaysia and South Africa are states with multiethnic populations, it is
important to see how these theories apply to their specific cases.
Colonial Strategies as Processes of State Formation
The origins of affirmative action policies are directly tied to processes of state formation,
as state formation is directly responsible for the creation and transformation of social groups –
and by extension, societal divides (Larson and Zalanga 2003). Closely related to the origins of
societal divides is the subject of identity formation, particularly as it relates to issues such as
citizenship (Brubaker 1998). In the cases of Malaysia and South Africa, the primary divides that
their affirmative action policies seek to remedy is political and economic inequalities resulting
from their respective history of race and ethnic relations.
Since South Africa and Malaysia were both former colonies of the same colonial master,
Great Britain, what factors could account for the extremely different societal structures and
policies which emerged? I argue that differences in colonial strategies are important not only for
the societal structures (and divides) that they create, but also because they shape social and
political identities. Go (2007) offers the concept of “provinciality:” policies of governance have
been different because of “the distinct characteristics of those whom empire aimed to rule” (77).
It is in the interest of the colonizer “to cultivate consent and compliance” (Go 2007: 99)
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wherever possible because, from a political and economic perspective, coercion of an oppressed
people is costly both economically and politically (Ikenberry 2001). This resulted in regimes that
“ultimately went native, shaping themselves to local conditions and incorporating what they
found there” (Go 2007: 99). Although the examples that Go provides were not settler colonies,
we will see later that the Afrikaner settlements that were established prior to the arrival of the
British were a very real “local condition” that the British colonizers had to deal with as they tried
to consolidate their power. From a different perspective, Steinmetz has claimed that policy
formation can be influenced by factors such as “geopolitical and economic interests [and the]
responses by the colonized” (Steinmetz 2008: 589). An example of this would be the reason the
British prevented native Malays from tin mining: not only the British had an interest in
minimizing competition for the valued resource; the rulers of the native Malays were mainly
cooperative with the British, being largely content with their arrangement with the British to
retain some authority over their subjects and domains. This reinforced the perception that
specific ethnic groups were assigned specific roles within Malay society; perceptions that could
not easily be broken. Tin mining became perceived as being immigrants’ jobs; while subsistence
farming remained the domain of the Malays.
By extension, the effects of the identities created by these colonial strategies influence
other elements of society such as markets and other institutions of economic activity. Based on
this premise, Larson and Zalanga (2003: 76) claim that “[s]uch economic activity and the
benefits that some derive from a system of categorical inequality create interests that advantaged
groups aim to protect.” The nature of these advantaged groups, however, is ambiguous; do they
constitute a ruling elite, or are they simply one among many interest groups?
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In the specific cases of Malaysia and South Africa, historical evidence appears to lean
toward the interest group explanation, best articulated by Block (1987). Arguing from a Marxist
perspective, he writes:

…capitalist rationality emerges out of the three-sided relationship among
capitalists, workers, and state managers. The structural position of state managers
forces them to achieve some consciousness of what is necessary to maintain the
viability of the social order … [however] the fact of consciousness does not imply
control over the historical process (67).

Larson and Zalanga claim in their analysis that contradictory class positions, as articulated by
Wright and others, do not “provide adequate insight in ethnically-divided societies” (Block 2003:
77) because by focusing solely on class structures, one fails to consider the influence of a
competing ethnic-based hierarchy. They state that “multiple axes of identity – class and
ethnicity – may be used to attempt to mobilize popular support for policies of ethnic
redistribution” (Larson and Zalanga 2003: 77). One can easily see how ethnic redistribution can
be easily framed as a viable remedial strategy; after all, in all cases of historical legal exclusion –
South Africa and Malaysia being no exception – legal exclusion has invariably been linked with
economic exclusion. In their study, Larson and Zalanga claim that the beneficiaries of favorable
state policies “successfully pursued [them] based on class interest, but mobilized support using
rhetoric of indigenous identity” (2003: 77). Calhoun (2007) reminds us that ethnic groups are the
creation of elites seeking to protect themselves and/or gain political/economic advantages.
Although it is beyond the historical scope of this paper, the same can be said of both South
Africa and Malaysia. Critics of affirmative action policies claim that these favorable policies are
examples of cronyism, where “[t]he government transferred wealth to a small pool of politically
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well-connected businessmen” (Fuller 2001) and effectively excluding the majority of the
‘favored’ ethnic group from enjoying the benefits.
In summary, although South Africa and Malaysia were both governed by the British, the
British did not enter the two countries with the same goals. Hence, the British employed different
strategies to govern these two colonies. Because the British only intended to exploit Malaysia’s
material resources, they did not see the need to bring in colonial settlers; their power was
consolidated by exploiting the already-existing divides between the country’s various ethnicities.
In contrast, the British had to contend with Afrikaners settlers for influence and power in South
Africa. The different strategies employed meant that different societal structures and divides
were created, directly influencing state attitudes and activities in each country’s respective
postcolonial era.
Thus far, we have examined theories which deal with the effects colonial strategies had
on societal structures and divides. This, however, is not a unidirectional influence. Edward Said
(1978) and others observed that, rather than rejecting the colonially-imposed – and therefore
alien – identities, members of these identities instead internalize them by forming groups which
advocate for and influence policies reinforcing these colonial identities (Larson and Zalanga
2003).
Effects of Colonial Strategies on State Policy
Because the influence of colonial strategies is not unidirectional, the resulting societal
divides and identities end up being self-reinforcing. This is reflected in differences in policy
outcomes, such as affirmative action (Dobbin 1994, Skocpol 1985). The application of Dobbin’s
framework to our cases suggest that the problems associated with inequality were perceived by
postcolonial political leaders in both countries as different sorts of problems requiring different
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solutions. In the cases of South Africa and Malaysia, relations between the post-colonial
politically-dominant group, the state, and the British (the common colonial elite) is a core
component in understanding why affirmative action policies in South Africa and Malaysia
diverged so sharply given their similar historical backgrounds.
Citizenship as State Policy
Citizenship policy bears a closer examination, as it is closely related with affirmative
action. The central question pertaining to citizenship is seemingly simple: should affirmative
action be considered a citizenship right? If we consider affirmative action to be an undeniable
and fundamental right of a privileged group of citizens of a nation, who is eligible for this right?
More specifically, should any group deserve types of state assistance such as affirmative action?
If so, then why are certain groups denied state assistance, and what can they do to attain it? This
question is related to the fundamental logic of retribution and restitution that is central to this
paper: why do some states adopt conciliatory policies, while others adopt antagonistic ones?
Because the dominant minority groups in both South Africa and Malaysia are foreign in origin,
the logical follow-up question is: are immigrant groups eligible for citizenship, and if so, what
are the criteria for citizenship? In addition, are citizenship rights universal for everyone, and if
not, how are they divided?
According to Brubaker (1998), the issue of citizenship for immigrants falls somewhere in
between two extremes. On one extreme, which Brubaker classifies as “traditional countries of
immigration,” citizenship is unconditionally granted to all people born in the country. On the
other extreme, citizenship is ethnically-based – meaning that immigrants, no matter how long or
deep their ties are to the country, can never be considered full citizens.
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In the cases of South Africa and Malaysia, there are two different ways one can interpret
this statement. Because the political elite in Malaysia were primarily made up of ethnic Malays,
given their history of legal exclusion from institutions of economic power, they had an interest
after gaining independence in sustaining ethnicity-based citizenship policies which classified
other ethnic groups as immigrants, regardless of their historical attachments to the country. On
the other hand, because the Afrikaners of South Africa were a non-indigenous minority group,
they had an interest in promoting assimilationist citizenship policies when their postindependence policy of apartheid ended.
As colonies of empires gained their independence, part of the exercise of selfdetermination involved answering questions of who should have citizenship rights. Common
bases for citizenship exclusion include religion and race (Larson and Aminzade 2009). In states
with racially-divided histories, such as Malaysia and South Africa, the non-indigenous origins of
the economically-dominant group allowed indigenous groups to portray them as foreign, and
therefore inassimilable. Citizenship rights are extremely important for several reasons. They
determine, for instance, who gets the right to political representation (Mamdani 2001, Brysk and
Shafir 2004), the right to enjoy social welfare provisions (Kale-Lostuvali 2007), and the right to
legal protection from a state’s coercive mechanisms (Einolf 2007). Anything less should be
considered a status that is less-than-full citizenship. In essence, debates on citizenship policy
center on two very closely-related questions: “whom the state really is supposed to represent and
which groups are legitimately resident in the country and merit membership in the nation-state
and citizenship rights” (Larson and Aminzade 2009: 171). If the purpose of the state is perceived
to be the representation of all citizens, then restitutive policies are more likely to be adopted,
especially when it is officially acknowledged that specific ethnicities have been historically
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mistreated and exploited. On the other hand, if the state exists to represent a chosen segment of
the population, particularly a historically marginalized one, then policies are more likely to be
retributive in nature.
There is one important point that should be noted about citizenship. According to Gellner
(2000), “[p]eople seem willing to accept and internalize any degree of inequality, however
extreme, provided it is stable, complex, and habitual” (282). Essentially, inequality on its own
does not stoke tensions between, in the cases of Malaysia and South Africa, different ethnic
groups. However, it is when this stability is disrupted, regardless of whether inequalities are
ameliorated or worsened, that racial tensions can be expected to rise. This claim should be kept
in mind as we examine how the dual political processes of historical events and both countries’
respective legacies of race relations affected affirmative action policies (Tilly 1995).

Data Analysis
History of Colonial Rule
Although both Malaysia and South Africa share a common colonial master, the situation
that their British colonizers faced when they first arrived was extremely different. In line with
Julian Go’s concept of “provinciality,” the policies the British ended up adopting also turned out
to be extremely different.
Mamdani (2001: 10) writes, “It is more or less a rule of thumb that the more Western
settlement a colony experienced, the greater was the violence unleashed against the native
population. The reason was simple: settler colonization led to land deprivation.” This was
definitely the case in South Africa, where there were numerous existing Afrikaner settlements
when the British seized control from the Dutch in 1806 (CIA 2008b). Because of their isolation
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from the urban centers where political power was concentrated, the British takeover of South
Africa did not initially have a great effect on the Afrikaner settlers, as they felt no strong
allegiance toward central authority. To begin with, the Afrikaners did not have much in common
with their new political leaders. Not only did they speak a different language, they also differed
culturally and religiously: the Afrikaners identified themselves as white, Afrikaans-speaking
Calvinists who were racially superior to the indigenous peoples they encountered (Dubow 1992,
Giliomee 2003, Lovell 1956, Tummala 1999).
Being rural frontiersmen, the Afrikaners had numerous clashes with natives as they
expanded further into the interior over issues pertaining to ownership of land. In addition, since
slavery was legal at the time, the Afrikaners relied heavily on the indigenous peoples –
particularly the Khoisan – as an inexpensive supply of labor. Although the Afrikaners were
already facing pressure from their clashes with indigenous peoples on the frontier, the British
colonizers further strained their relations with the settlers by implementing policies that the
Afrikaners perceived as threatening:

When that authority [the British] did not support [their frontier culture], they were
disappointed. When it went further in challenging their values in the late
eighteenth century by cautiously nibbling at theoretical black-white equality,
including mild approval of mission institutions, or land reserves, for Hottentots
[in more neutral terms, the Khoisan], they were outraged at government for
endangering both their group identity and their labor supply (Lovell 1956: 310).

Specific examples of such measures include the Nineteenth Ordinance (1826) which
permitted slaves to testify against their masters in criminal cases, and the Fifteenth Ordinance
(1828) which declared that “all free persons, regardless of color, had equal rights, including
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landholding,” essentially the antithesis of Afrikaner values (Lovell 1956: 311-2). Another
example of colonial policy coming into conflict with Afrikaner values was the British push to
free slave labor and to bring these former slaves under wage labor. These ideological clashes
were eventually transformed into a full-fledged Afrikaner nationalist movement, culminating in
armed and violent clashes such as the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 (Lovell 1956, Sakarai 1976).
This history of violent struggle became a defining characteristic of South Africa’s transition to
independence in 1910 (CIA 2008b).
In contrast, there was negligible resistance to the British takeover in Malaysia. First of all,
unlike South Africa, there were no European settlements in Malaysia when the British first
arrived during the late 18th century (CIA 2008a); nor did the British attempt to establish any. As
a result, the British did not attempt to blatantly interfere with pre-existing power structures in the
territory. More specifically, the British “allow[ed] the sultans to retain the trappings – but only
the trappings – of authority, and … encouraged the rest of the Malay population to continue its
traditional activities,” that of subsistence farming (Wyzan 1990: 50-1). Consequently, physical
labor for Malaysia’s British-run rubber plantations and tin mines was almost entirely dependent
on immigrant groups such as the Chinese and the Indians (Sowell 2004).
By mandating that the indigenous peoples remain subsistence farmers and fishermen, the
Malays did not participate in and become competitors for British interests – namely, plantation
agriculture and tin mining (Wyzan 1990). At the same time, the British tacitly approved the
existence of a burgeoning Chinese merchant class (Larson and Zalanga 2003, Sowell 2004,
Wyzan 1990), as it for most part did not compete with the main British economic interest of tin
mining and processing. It is noteworthy that the British did provide Malays with some
preferential treatment under the rationale of trusteeship and tutelage, privileges which were
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enjoyed largely by a small, select group hailing from elite families (Wyzan 1990). This included
education preparing them for careers in the civil service via positions that had been explicitly
earmarked for Malays (Larson and Zalanga 2003, Sowell 2004, Wyzan 1990). This resulted in
political power being shared between the British and Malays on the lower levels of the
bureaucracy; overall, however, the British made sure to maintain the upper hand.
It is important to note that the British nor any of its subject populations attempted to
blatantly push for the exclusion or expulsion of any other group in the same manner as South
Africa – largely because these different populations voluntarily kept themselves apart: they
worked in different industries, lived in segregated neighborhoods, and had different power
bases – rural areas for Malays; urban areas for the Chinese (Sowell 2004).
This cooptation of Malaysia’s various ethnic groups was an integral part of British
colonial strategy, one that has been replicated in some of Great Britain’s other colonies. This
strategy stands in sharp contrast to the British strategy in South Africa, where the British actively
sought to weaken and displace Afrikaner power and authority. Since the British valued Malaysia
simply for their material resources, as long as they were able to obtain it, they did not see any
need to reform, much less disrupt, the state of Malaysian society.
As a result, Malaysia’s transition to independence was relatively peaceful. Because
Malaysian independence in 1957 did not come as a result of an armed struggle, the British were
able to retain significant influence over the transition itself and place conditions on the newlyindependent country. The most significant conditions included: the formation of a broadly-based
pro-Britain government capable of holding together a culturally heterogeneous Malaysian society,
guarantees of Malaysian political supremacy, guaranteed protection of Chinese capitalist
interests, and the liberalization of citizenship requirements (Larson and Zalanga 2003: 78).
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Ethnic Relations
Basis of Franchise. Due to the different transitions to independence that both states
experienced, both states experienced very different legacies of ethnic relations. To begin with,
bases of franchise established were extremely different. Because of the peaceful nature of the
Malaysian transition, the United Kingdom was able to influence not only the creation of a fully
democratic government, but also its preliminary framework for citizenship. In essence, everyone
who was a legally-recognized citizen of Malaysia was eligible for political participation. Even
though the British had guaranteed the indigenous Malays political supremacy, British guarantees
to the other ethnic groups enabled them to mobilize politically. Because Malaysian society was,
from the very beginning, split along racial and ethnic lines, three dominant political parties
emerged, each representing one of the major ethnic groups: the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian
Congress (MIC) (Larson and Zalanga 2003, Sowell 2004). In part owing to the ethnic proportion
of Malaysian society, the dominant party has long been the UMNO, with the MCA as their
primary coalition partner to this present day. This ethnic divide in political participation is far
more pronounced among the chief opposition parties, such as the Chinese Democratic Action
Party (DAP) and the Malay Partai Islam (PAS), a fundamentalist group. These parties have
“generally taken more forceful stands in favor of their ethnic constituencies” (Wyzan 1990: 53).
There is an interesting side note to Malaysia’s political situation. Prior to independence,
the continuing flow of Chinese immigrants into the country meant that, at one point, the
indigenous Malays were a demographic minority in their own country. For instance, in 1948,
Malaysia’s population was 45% Chinese, 43% Malay, and 10% Indian (Mills 1964). An eventual
slowdown in Chinese immigration, coupled with Malays’ higher fertility rates, restored the
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indigenous Malays’ majority. However, upon independence, Malaysia’s population was still
fairly evenly split between indigenous and non-indigenous groups (Larson and Zalanga 2003). In
1965, in a bid to strengthen their political situation, the Malay government took the
unprecedented decision to expel Singapore, a city with an extremely large Chinese population,
from the Malaysian state (Sowell 2004). The expulsion of Singapore left the indigenous Malays
firmly in political control in Malaysia.
In contrast, South Africa established a far-from-democratic government upon
independence. Although the British had granted indigenous natives the right to vote prior to
independence, Afrikaner nationalists took advantage of the low voter turnout rates of the
indigenous natives by introducing new measures designed to lessen their political impact. For
example, in 1931, the Statute of Westminster was approved and enacted; an important issue
which the statute legalized was the enfranchisement of all European women and the small
population of disenfranchised European men (Lovell 1956: 324-5). Although the natives had
been politically weak since before independence, this measure essentially stripped them of their
franchise. As history shows us, the natives (classified as Blacks) were excluded from economic
and political participation until the landmark elections of 1994.
The Distribution of Economic Opportunities. This historical process is one where the
effects of the colonial strategy employed by the British colonizers proved to be enduring. As
previously mentioned, while under colonial rule, the various ethnic groups in Malaysia were
assigned to non-competing roles. However, after independence, Malaysian society remained
voluntarily segregated. The heart of the issue is not difficult to determine: after all, the different
ethnic groups spoke different languages, adhered to different religions, and basically had
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different lifestyles (Sowell 2004: 57). During colonial rule, the British colonizers were able to
find common ground by using English as the primary language in government and in schools.
Although different ethnically-based political parties were founded during independence,
these parties were initially organized around an inclusive coalition known as the Alliance Party
(Jomo 1990, Larson and Zalanga 2003). Central to the Alliance were goals seeking to increase
indigenous Malay representation in business and the promotion of joint business investment
between the Chinese and Malays (Larson and Zalanga 2003: 79). Not surprisingly, sections of
the growing Malay elite were unhappy with the Alliance’s policies, and they made their views
known in the May 1969 elections which sparked the race riots. According to Jomo (1990), the
results of the elections were an indication of three related developments:

(1) growing disillusion among the Malaysian public with the Alliance
government’s policies, especially in the economic and cultural spheres; (2)
rejection among the growing Malay middle class of the Tunku’s [Tunku Abdul
Rahman was the Malaysian head of state] accommodative policy to Chinese and
foreign capital; and (3) the electoral rejection of the Alliance, especially in
Peninsular Malaysia, in favour of an ethnically divided opposition (471).

The election results were also noteworthy because of the proportion of people who voted against
the Alliance. Based on the Alliance Party’s goals, one would be tempted to conclude that
members of non-indigenous ethnic groups would be strongly in favor of the party and the
policies they were promising to implement. This was not the case, however: according to
estimates, “about half the Malays voted against the Alliance together with about two-thirds of
non-Malays” (Jomo 1990: 470).
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Indigenous Malay interest in the economic sector can be attributed to a basic supply-anddemand model. As mentioned previously, Britain’s colonial legacy designated education and
government as the near-exclusive domains of the indigenous Malays. Specific examples of such
colonial policies include the guarantee of free education and the earmarking of jobs within the
colonial bureaucracy for ethnic Malays (Sowell 2004, Wyzan 1990). Upon independence, the
rapidly-growing Malaysian university-trained middle class were initially absorbed into the
government, which had been guaranteed by the British to be the near-exclusive domain of the
indigenous peoples. However, since there were only a finite number of available positions in the
government bureaucracy, the members of the middle class shifted its focus to the economic
realm (Jomo 1990), pushing their government for policies that would favor their entry into
business while inhibiting perceived sources of competition (namely, the Chinese and foreign
investors). Larson and Zalanga’s claim that beneficiaries of state policies favoring class interests
justify their interests using indigenous identity is confirmed by Jomo, who states that those
responsible for drafting the NEP were aware, to some extent, that “[t]he growing ethnic divide
had a class texture” (Jomo 1990: 471).
The situation in South Africa is, in comparison, far less complicated. Under apartheid,
discrimination in employment (among other fields) was institutionalized in laws such as the
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. Prior to 1979, access to skilled work was virtually
monopolized by white trade unions, who essentially served as gatekeepers restricting the access
of blacks to apprenticeships required for skilled work. Although most of these laws were found
to constitute unfair labor practices and legally abolished in 1979, de facto racial discrimination in
employment still persisted (Horwitz, Bowmaker-Falconer, and Searll 1995).
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Like the British in Malaysia, the Afrikaners sought to assign the various ethnic groups in
South Africa to clearly-defined roles. General Hertzog, an Afrikaner nationalist during the 1930s
and 1940s, believed that since both groups had the right to self-determination in South Africa,
there had to be a balance of power in South Africa, as the realization of self-determination for
one group would invariably infringe on the claims of the other. Therefore, because blacks had
numerical superiority, the minority Afrikaners were entitled to political, economic, and military
superiority. Furthermore, he also believed that this ‘stale-mate’ could only be resolved either
through war (in other words, ‘ploughing under’ the other group) or ‘separate development,’ his
idea of a peaceful solution (Giliomee 2003: 386-7).
Horwitz et al. (1995: 683) confirms that General Hertzog’s views were indeed influential
in the apartheid-era South African state: “Until 1994, the fragmented nature of South African
society offered few unifying symbols. Systems were designed to keep people apart, and more
emphasis has been put on differences rather than those aspects on which to build a common
testing.”
At this point of the comparison, both South Africa and Malaysia had converged on very
similar and exclusionary policies, despite whatever differences they may have had during their
respective transitions to independence. These similar policies seem to share a common root: a
rebellion against the colonial legacy that their British colonizers tried to implement shortly
before or during the nations’ respective transitions to independence. In Malaysia’s case, the
introduction and implementation of preferential policies for indigenous Malays ran directly
counter to British guarantees of protection for Chinese capitalist interests. In the case of South
Africa, apartheid was effectively a reversal of British attempts to reform race relations between
the Afrikaners and indigenous peoples. In addition, the ideas employed to justify both
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preferential policies for Malays and apartheid are somewhat similar – that both groups had an
inherent right to their social positions. The wording of these rationales appears to suggest that
their authors expected them to be open-ended, infinite, and lasting. Given this claim, what is
responsible for South Africa’s dramatic reversal of their existing ethnic policies in the early
1990s? In addition, why has Malaysia not experienced a similar turnaround in their pre-NEP
ethnic policies?
The Role of International Pressure on Domestic Policies. Any discussion about the
transformation of domestic policies would be incomplete if we disregard the effects of
international pressure, particularly since the two cases examined here implemented their
respective affirmative action policies in the latter half of the twentieth century. It is during this
time that improvements in methods of communication and the rising popularity of global
discourses such as human rights, coupled with the post-World War II order that was constructed
(most notably, the United Nations), that gave the international stage the prominence and
legitimacy to function as a source of pressure on domestic policies.
An example of this is the South African political elites’ attempts to use the discourse of
indigenous rights to justify their policies. As evidenced by General Hertzog’s claims, the
Afrikaners used this discourse to defend their rights to self-determination, and by extension, their
claims to the land.
It is generally accepted among scholars of indigenous peoples’ movements that there is
no universal and all-inclusive definition that can be used to define who and/or what indigenous
peoples are. Hence, as things currently stand among the international community of indigenous
peoples, a group is considered indigenous if other indigenous groups deem it as such (Anaya
2004, Daes 1996, Kingsbury 1998). This determining factor is very important, especially when
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applied to the case of the Afrikaners (Niezen 2003: 22) – although they have a legitimate claim
to many ‘factors’ that could classify them as ‘indigenous,’ such as having a longtime connection
to the land, a distinct culture and language, etc., it is difficult to bestow upon them the status of
‘indigenous people’ and its accompanying ‘advantages’ such as international networking and
special recognition from their national government simply because they have not been accepted
into the international indigenous people community.
Because the Afrikaners were denied the use of indigenous claims to justify their actions,
it made them much more susceptible to international criticism over their apartheid policies,
particularly in the aftermath of the Second World War. International organizations such as the
United Nations took the lead in providing increasingly hostile positions against apartheid – a
notable example of this was a “post-war series of UNESCO-sponsored pamphlets in which top
scientific authorities were afforded the opportunity to destroy prevailing racial myths” (Dubow
1992: 231). In addition, the international anti-apartheid struggle waged an ideological campaign
which linked apartheid to Nazi policies of racial purity, and by extension, portrayed apartheid as
a crime against humanity (Dubow 1992, Giliomee 2003). While it is true that the Afrikaners
initially employed pro-Fascist ideologies formulated during their struggle for independence from
Great Britain, their sensitivity to international pressure forced them to find other ways of
alleviating the criticisms being leveled at them. This, according to Dubow (1992: 201), led “to a
coyness about the use of explicit racist formulations and a withdrawal from the pro-Fascist
sentiment which was evident during the war.” More specifically, “one of the favored responses
[to this onslaught of international criticism] was the disavowal of any connexion between
apartheid and notions of innate racial superiority” (Dubow 1992: 235). In addition, the
government found it necessary on two occasions – in 1979 and again in 1988 – to repeal laws
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upholding statutory discrimination, such as the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 (Horwitz,
Bowmaker-Falconer and Searll 1995: 673). Although it would take somewhat longer for the
government to formally acknowledge and challenge the presence of de facto discrimination in
the workplace, continuing international pressure predominantly based on the themes of human
rights eventually led to the downfall of apartheid and the reversal of laws and policies that have
long excluded the indigenous natives from mechanism of political and economic power.
In contrast, the Malays in Malaysia did not face the same difficulties affecting the
Afrikaners in South Africa. For one, the British colonizers’ grand strategy institutionalized the
role of the state as the protector of the indigenous peoples (Kale-Lostuvali 2007, Larson and
Aminzade forthcoming, Wyzan 1990). More specifically:

It was official British policy to preserve the use of the indigenous forms and
institutions of the Malays, and to be solicitous of their views, in keeping with the
philosophy that colonial rule was a form of trusteeship for the Malays, with the
British acting as “umpire” mainly to keep the alien Chinese at bay (Comber 1983:
11).

It is clear that international pressure figured only minimally in shaping Malaysian domestic
policies, in contrast to South Africa. When the indigenous Malays assumed political power, they
inherited state mechanisms from their former colonial masters, along with the idea of the state as
the defender of indigenous rights. A key factor that legitimated this arrangement was something
that could not and was not applicable to the Afrikaners of South Africa: namely, although the
Malays had political power, they lagged far behind the Chinese in terms of economic power.
Hence:
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[b]y grounding claims in purported indigeneity advocates of race-based policies
of redress based their arguments either on entitlement of indigenous peoples to
resources distributed by the state or the need for state policies designed to
redistribute wealth and income by limiting ownership and property rights for nonindigenous citizens (Larson and Aminzade 2009: 172).

This factor enabled the ethnic Malays to frame their legal justifications for their ethnicallypreferential domestic policies in a way which deflected and decreased international criticism,
particularly those pertaining to ethnic redistribution. More importantly, it also denied the nonindigenous Chinese a platform – namely, the international discourse of civil and human rights –
which they could use to voice their grievances. For example, while the Malaysian government
acknowledges that some of their preferential policies run counter to international norms (Jomo
1990), their official view is that “civil liberties and democratic rights have to be sacrificed in the
interest of export growth” (Jomo 1990: 490). Although the Malaysian government has framed
their reasons for these preferential policies along the lines of “eliminat[ing] the identification of
race with economic function” (Jomo 1990: 474), Jomo warns that this ideology is ultimately
dishonest and self-serving, biased toward the interests of the ruling elite.
At present, it is difficult to predict how long the indigenous Malays will be able to
continue using this rationale to justify their preferential policies. Although it is beyond the
specified scope of this paper, evidence has shown that despite their claims that these policies
benefit a large swath of the Malay population, the chief beneficiaries have been a very small core
group of elite Malays; the majority of ethnic Malays have not benefitted economically from these
policies. Most significantly, despite the legal hurdles that have been placed before them, the
Chinese have made the most of their disadvantaged position by actually increasing their share of
the Malaysian economy (Jomo 1990). A rough estimate showed that the Chinese controlled
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27.2% of Malaysia’s wealth in 1970. Despite three decades of government favoritism toward
indigenous businesses and enterprises, the Chinese increased their share of the Malaysia
economy to approximately 40% by the early 1990s (Fuller 2001). Based on the available
evidence, I believe that as long as the Chinese continue to control a demographicallydisproportionate percentage of the Malaysian economy, the indigenous Malays will have reasons
to continue employing the same rhetoric which have kept the international community (and their
criticisms) at bay.
Policy Outcomes
Because Malaysia did not experience international criticism over their preferential
policies, the present-day views of the economically-dominant group have not changed since
colonial times. Present views of the dominant group is an important consideration while
analyzing the historical origins of these cases’ affirmative action policies, because it sheds some
insight into why Malaysia’s ethnically-preferential policies have not changed since the 1960s –
and still persists so strongly today, while South Africa experienced an almost-complete reversal
of apartheid. Although Malays at present have already enjoyed some benefits from the
preferential policies of the NEP, this continues to be an important issue, especially since the NEP
was originally designed to have a finite start and end date: 1971 – 1990 (Jomo 1990). At this
point, the rationale for the NEP is still very much a valid and important point, particularly
because there is much pressure for the Malaysian government to extend the affirmative action
policies under the NEP past 1990 (Jomo 1990: 469).
Because the indigenous Malays still have relatively-uncontested claims to political
power, the other ethnic groups are still considered to this day to be immigrants – and as such,
less-than-full citizens. Although there are some who claim that these preferential policies have,
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in part, drastically reduced the incidences of “serious ethnic clashes” in Malaysia (Fuller 2001),
others have claimed that interethnic tensions have actually worsened (Jomo 1990: 492). This is
the essence of Malaysia’s rationale for implementing and sustaining retributive affirmative
action policies: colonial identities established during British rule have persisted to this day
primarily due to the lack of external pressures mandating for change.
In contrast, South African policies have changed dramatically since their experience with
colonialism. Precisely because the Afrikaners lost their bid for legitimacy for their claims of selfdetermination on the international stage, they have had to find new ways of integrating
themselves into a society in which they are an undisputed minority.
The solution the Afrikaners stumbled upon was that of economic cooperation. During the
early 1990s, business managers realized that apartheid policies had left South Africa with a
severely underdeveloped human capital resource base. Compared to many other nations, the
legacy forged by apartheid included high unemployment and low literacy rates. The presence of
a growing unskilled labor pool coupled with high unemployment rates contributed to low
economic growth, in addition to poor labor and capital productivity. The private sector was the
first to address these economic shortcomings in the early 1990s, employing the rhetoric and
context of a growing global movement toward multiculturalism (Adam 1997, Horwitz et al.
1995). The late apartheid government soon followed suit through efforts at building national
unity, ultimately resulting in the enshrining of the bases of affirmative action policies in the new
Constitution in inclusive terms. More specifically, the Constitution pledges to “recognize the
injustices of our past,” states that the country belongs “to all who live in it, united in our
diversity,” and promises to “heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights” (Tummala 1999: 499).
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The political changes bought about during South Africa’s transition period during the
mid-1990s provided South African firms with two main reasons to embrace inclusive affirmative
action policies. First was the threat of potential government enforcement of new antidiscrimination legislation that stemmed from the new Constitution. Second was the need to
capture the allegiance (and consumer base) of the newly-enfranchised Blacks – this was most
commonly achieved by the increased hiring of blacks, particularly into management positions
(Adam 1997: 233-235). In simpler terms, South African firms began to rationalize affirmative
action in terms of legitimacy and credibility, principally in the marketplace. Consequently, where
discrimination was once viewed favorably, it now was seen as inhibiting benefits that could be
gained, both in terms of the labor and consumer bases of companies. According to Adam (1997:
238), “[a]ffirmative action represent[ed] a rational response to the removal of the artificial
constraints in the labor market.”
Of all the similarities that Malaysia and South Africa share, both historically and
presently, there is one that has not yet been explicitly mentioned. Since both nations in the
present day have achieved legitimacy, from the perspectives of both the international arena and
the domestic electorate, their focus is now on the pursuit of economic growth. The findings of
this paper show that although the current political elite in both nations has made economic
growth a national priority, they also see very different strategies for achieving this goal. Malaysia
favors the continuation of their retributive affirmative action policies, as their articulated
envisioned goal is to achieve Malay control over the nation’s political and economic spheres. On
the other hand, in South Africa, history has conclusively shown that exclusionary policies such
as apartheid do not encourage economic growth, from the standpoint of both international
standing and the effective use of the domestic labor force.
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Conclusion
Despite their many similarities, Malaysia’s and South Africa’s differences in affirmative
action policies can be traced back to the circumstances surrounding each country’s respective
transition to independence, as this transition to independence essentially set in motion the
historical processes responsible for the two nations’ different policies. Although both countries
were former colonies of Great Britain, the British left two very different legacies of ethnic
relations behind, legacies which persisted long beyond the act of independence itself. In
Malaysia, political power was handed to the majority ethnicity – the indigenous Malays –
whereas in South Africa, control of the political and economic spheres was forcibly seized by the
non-indigenous Afrikaners. These distinctions led to several notable differences between the two
states. South Africa ended up being ruled by an ethnic minority; consequently, this meant that
they had to resort to coercive (and non-democratic) means to hold on to their advantaged
position in South African society. Being unable to obtain legitimacy from the international
community for their claims to indigeneity, and therefore to self-determination, the Afrikaners
were extremely susceptible to international pressure as they were increasingly isolated on the
world stage. This eventually led to the downfall of apartheid and resulted in the Afrikaners’
search for other unifying symbols, such as economic success and multiculturalism, to justify
their continued existence in South Africa. In contrast, although the British implemented a fully
democratic government in Malaysia before they left, several colonial legacies of the British
colonizers exacerbated ethnic tensions and made it very difficult to forge a national unity among
the various ethnicities. Because political power for the Malays were guaranteed by the British,
along with their being a demographic majority, the Malays were able to use the post-election
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riots of 1969 as an excuse to implement economic policies which favored Malays and directly
targeted the Chinese. Because the British colonizers had always intended for the state to protect
the interests of ethnic Malays, the Malays were able to avoid criticism from international actors
such as other states and the United Nations. That the Chinese have continued to do well
economically despite the Malaysian government’s unfavorable policies toward them have
provided the political Malay elite with the mandate granted to them by the electorate to continue
the current policies of economic redistribution.
From the claims and data presented in this paper, there are many possibilities for further
research. At several instances, I have cited notable points that were beyond the scope of this
paper. One of them is a more focused and elaborate analysis into whether these affirmative
action policies have actually aided their intended beneficiaries, and if so, then by how much.
Based on my analysis thus far, it would seem as if retributive policies are the less-effective
method for affirmative action, benefitting only a small portion of its intended beneficiaries. In
the Malaysia’s case, I hypothesize this to be so because it is in the interests of the ethnic-Malay
political elite to maintain the status quo in race relations for political gain. Because much of their
political platform is based on exploiting the ethnic tensions in Malaysian society, any
improvement in the social and economic conditions of most ethnic Malays would prove to be
detrimental to the elite’s grip on political power. In contrast, the only way the minority
Afrikaners were able to hold on to power throughout most of South Africa’s history was through
coercion. When international and economic pressure eventually rendered apartheid policies
unfeasible, the Afrikaners – who controlled both political and economic power – quickly
capitulated, essentially giving up their political power by employing inclusive policies and
enfranchising the previously-oppressed Blacks in exchange for continued economic success.
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Both of these examples support Calhoun’s (2007) claim that ethnic groups are the creation of
elites seeking to protect themselves and/or gain political/economic advantages.
More specifically, it would be interesting to investigate whether the differing natures of
the two countries’ policies had any effect on how successful the policies were at meeting their
aim of economic redistribution. This may, of course, be difficult to determine in the case of
South Africa, given how recently their affirmative action policies were actually implemented. It
could very well turn out that we will not be able to draw any definite conclusions about the
effectiveness of the Employment Equity Act. Another narrower topic for further research would
be an examination into how and why the Chinese in Malaysia were able to increase their share of
the Malaysian economy despite of all the policies that have been placed against them. For a more
theoretical focus, one could examine how the Chinese in Malaysia attempted to remedy or
alleviate the effects of the discriminatory policies they were faced with, as this is something that
did not come up in the various sources cited in this study. What mechanisms of redress did the
Chinese seek to employ? Did they attempt to mobilize international discourses (for example,
human rights, multiculturalism, etc.), and if so, why were they not successful? The answers to
the potential research questions posed above would not only enrich the analysis of historical
papers such as this one, but it would also contribute to a better understanding of affirmative
action policies itself: whose interests it serves, who it helps, and what dangers it faces to
achieving its noble (or ignoble, depending on intent) goal of alleviating the inequalities apparent
in many societies in the world.
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